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In their article, Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Eco-
nomic Analysis,' Richard Clarke, Frederick Warren-Boulton, David
Smith, and Marilyn Simon ("the authors") of the Justice Department's
Antitrust Division confirm the insurance industry's view that the limited
federal antitrust exemption accorded to the industry under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act' did not contribute to the crisis in property-casualty insur-
ance which occurred in 1985 and 1986. Indeed, their report dispels some
of the myths that have been perpetuated by industry critics, who have
attributed the blame for the liability crisis to (1) collusive activity by in-
surers, (2) price increases by inefficient and inept insurance companies
damaged by their investment losses in the early 1980s, and (3) inadequate
state insurance regulation.' The authors substantiate the views of the Jus-
tice Department's Tort Policy Working Group, which in two earlier anal-
yses concluded that these factors were unlikely to have caused the crisis."
The Working Group concluded that changing patterns in our civil justice
system are the principal cause of the liability crisis.'
t Federal Affairs Counsel, American Insurance Association. B.S.F.S. 1977, Georgetown Univer-
sity; M.P.A., 1980, J.D., 1980, Syracuse University. I would like to thank Craig Berrington, General
Counsel of the American Insurance Association, for his helpful comments.
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While we support the authors' thesis that the erosion of fault as the
standard of tort liability is the primary cause of the insurance crisis, we
believe that we can further add to their discussion an understanding of
how the McCarran-Ferguson Act operates. We intend to explain why the
limited antitrust exemption is necessary and how the public benefits from
its implementation. This Comment first explains the motives underlying
passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and then proceeds to examine its
place in the insurance market. The Comment shows that, in the absence
of the Act, rigorous standards of state involvement would require a much
higher degree of state regulation and would impose inordinate costs on the
consumer and the industry.
I. The McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Mechanics of the Insurance
Market
Enacted in 1945, the McCarran-Ferguson Act has two major compo-
nents. The first reserves authority for states to regulate and tax the insur-
ance industry.6 The second exempts insurers from federal antitrust regu-
lation to the extent that states already regulate insurance.7 Thus, insurers
are protected from federal intervention under the Sherman Antitrust Act.'
State insurance commissioners played a prominent role in the debate
which preceded the adoption of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.9 They were
concerned that the Supreme Court decision in United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association,"0 which defined insurance as interstate
commerce, would deprive them of the right to regulate and tax insurers
within their states. Insurance regulation had long been a state prerogative.
While the commissioners were clearly interested in preserving their tradi-
tional authority, they also believed that the states, not the federal govern-
ment, were the proper source of regulation." Insurance rates are often
predicated on the legal and demographic characteristics of individual
states, and state regulators are therefore better equipped than the federal
government to supervise the activities of insurers.
practical reasons to suggest that it did not." Id.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982).
7. Id. § 1012(b).
8. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp. III
1985)).
9. For a discussion of the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Group Life &
Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 217-24 (1979).
10. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
11. See Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-
Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 Mien L. REV. 545, 566-67 (1958) (McCarran-Ferguson
Act embodies federal policy that regulation of insurance industry be conducted by states).
Vol. 5: 417, 1988
Shattering Myths
The exemption from federal antitrust laws, controversial when it was
enacted in 1945, continues to provoke debate. There is a common mis-
perception that the exemption is complete. In fact, the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts insurance companies from antitrust litigation only
if: (1) the activity at issue constitutes the business of insurance, (2) the
activity is regulated by state law, and (3) the activity does not amount to
boycott, coercion, or intimidation.12 The essential question raised both
then and now is why the insurance industry warrants a unique exemption
from national antitrust laws. To answer this question, one must under-
stand the unique characteristics of the insurance market.
Unlike the provider of almost any other good or service, the insurer
does not know at the time the insurance contract is entered into the total
costs that will ultimately be incurred. In contrast, an automobile manufac-
turer, for example, knows the production and sales costs at the time a car
is sold and is thus able to calculate with a reasonable degree of certainty
the costs that must be recovered from the final sale price of the car in
order to break even or make a profit. Even providers of financial services,
such as equity underwriters, who also work with a nonfungible risk, are
nonetheless capable of ascertaining the net worth of the company and can
determine, albeit with less certainty than manufacturers, the price they
must obtain for their product in order to recover its costs and make a
profit. Moreover, an equity underwriter's risk is smaller than that of an
insurance underwriter since losses, should they occur, become apparent at
the time the issue is first made available in a public offering. By contrast,
in return for a premium, an insurer must promise the insured indemnifi-
cation for any injury covered by the insurance contract. Therefore, in or-
der for insurers to determine an appropriate price for their product, they
must rely on statistical projections. The accuracy and adequacy of these
projections are important not only to the insurer but also to insurance
regulators who need such information to determine whether the price
charged by the insurer is illegally inadequate, excessive, or
discriminatory. 8
12, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982); see Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The McCarran-
Ferguson Act and Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81, 89-107 (1983) (discussing legislative
history and judicial construction of these three requirements).
13. Most state insurance codes begin with a section stating the purpose of the regulation. A typi-
cal statute reads as follows:
The purpose of this chapter is to promote the public welfare by regulating insurance rates to
the end that they shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory, and to author-
ize and regulate cooperative action among insurers in rate-making and in other matters within
the scope of this chapter. Nothing in this chapter is intended:
(1) To prohibit or discourage reasonable competition; or
(2) Prohibit or encourage except to the extent necessary to accomplish the aforementioned
purpose, uniformity in insurance rates, rating systems, rating plans or practices.
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As is generally the case with statistical analyses, the larger and more
representative the sample, the greater the probability that predictions
based on it will be acceptably accurate. A broader range of actuarial data
provides a more accurate assessment of the losses and expenses associated
with a particular insurance line. With few exceptions, no single insurer
has sufficient statistical evidence to calculate an actuarially sound rate and
must therefore pool its data with other insurers. 4 Thus most of today's
data are collected by advisory organizations and transmitted to insurers in
various forms, including advisory rates. Statistical reporting agencies, such
as the Insurance Services Office (ISO), aggregate loss data and loss adjust-
ment expenses and provide trending information to insurers as well as to
insurance regulators.'6 Insurers participating with the ISO may then
choose to deviate from the advisory rates according to their individual
marketing strategies after assessing how their particular business and ex-
penses compare with industry averages. 6 Such pooling of information is
valuable to insurers, regulators, and ultimately, consumers.
II. Public Benefits of the Antitrust Exemption
Real benefits flow from this aggregation of actuarial data by the insur-
ance industry. Not only does this aggregation assist in the regulation of
insurers for solvency, but it also promotes competition within the indus-
try.' 7 Small companies, which would otherwise lack the means to deter-
This chapter shall be liberally interpreted to carry into effect the provisions of this section.
ALA. CODE § 27-13-1 (1975).
14. See INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE, INC., INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE IN A COMPETITIVE
MARKETPLACE: ISO's ROLE WITHIN THE PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY 7-8
(1987).
15. Id.
16. In testimony before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, industry critic Robert
Hunter alleged that the ISO advisory rates reflected the average cost of the least efficient insurers.
Were this true, almost every company could price its product below the advisory rate and still make a
substantial profit. Yet according to data compiled by A.M. Best, the annual rate of return as a per-
centage of net worth for the industry has consistently been lower for insurance companies than for
Fortune 500 companies. See Insurance Industry Financial Condition: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-54 (1987) (testimony of J. Robert Hunter, Pres., Nat'l Ins.
Consumer Org.); see also INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE, INC., INSURER PROFITABILITY-THE FACTS
8, table A (1986).
17. In 1942, the top eight insurance groups held a 27% market share in the property-casualty
insurance business. In 1986, the top eight groups commanded a market share of 25.2%. This decrease
occurred when market concentration for most major industries was increasing. A.M. BEST Co.,
BEST'S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES: PROPERTY-CASUALTY, 102, 252 (1987) (1986 figure calculated
by dividing total property-casualty premiums less accident and health (S57.6 billion) by net premium
($176.5 billion)); R. HENSLEY, COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NON-
LIFE INSURANCE 29, table 3 (1962); see also R.A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of
Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1988).
Vol. 5: 417, 1988
Shattering Myths
mine an actuarially sound rate, are given access to the same information
available to larger companies.
The limited antitrust exemption not only allows insurers to receive
enough information to make actuarially sound rates, but also permits
them to develop standardized policy forms which are likely to stabilize the
cost of purchasing insurance policies. These standardized forms enable in-
surance customers and regulators to make meaningful price and coverage
comparisons among insurers."8 If each insurer were to issue its own
forms, even the most sophisticated consumer would find it impossible to
make meaningful comparisons of the prices and services offered by differ-
ent companies. Such data would also be of little use for rulemaking and
regulatory monitoring.
Instances will also arise in which insurers who have jointly developed
forms and data will nevertheless find it impossible to serve a market be-
cause no single insurer has the capacity to underwrite the risk. The anti-
trust exemption resolves this problem by allowing insurers to pool their
resources to provide liability coverage where it might not otherwise be
made available. An example of such a pool is the American Nuclear In-
surers, 19 a cooperative organization comprising some 800 companies
which insures nuclear power plants. The extraordinary costs of any possi-
ble nuclear accident make the risk too large for any one insurer to cover.
Accordingly, a large number of companies must be assembled to under-
write the risk. Pools of smaller companies may also be established to allow
them to compete with larger insurers.
Finally, in certain instances state insurance commissioners themselves
require insurers to provide coverage jointly. For example, in many states
it is compulsory to obtain automobile coverage." ° States have established
assigned risk plans to minimize the risk that selective underwriting will
prevent drivers from obtaining compulsory insurance because of poor driv-
ing records.2 These plans run contrary to antitrust concepts because they
specifically set out the coverage, premium, commission, and form of the
policy.22 A similar residual market mechanism exists for property insur-
ance in inner cities. Known as Fair Access to Insurance Requirements
plans (FAIR), they require insurers to provide coverage at prices and
18. INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 16, at 7.
19. Hearings on S. 843 Before the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (statement of Joseph Marrone, Gen.
Counsel & Sr. Vice Pres. of Am. Nuclear Insurers) (official report forthcoming).
20. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ANN., ch. 175, § 113A (West 1987) (requiring insurance of all
vehicles). For a discussion of the Massachusetts experience, see Giffin & Hillman, Automobile Insur-
ance Reform Law: Highlights of Chapter 266 of the Acts of 1976, 61 MAss. L.Q. 211 (1977).
21. MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 175, § 113H (West 1987).
22. Id.
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terms set by the state government as a precondition for doing business in
the state.23 Absent the protection of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, these
residual market mechanisms could be held subject to antitrust scrutiny as
per se violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act since they constitute a con-
certed effort to fix prices.24
III. The State Action Doctrine
While the authors do not dispute that the unusual characteristics of the
insurance industry make it more necessary for participants in the market
to engage in joint activities than for participants in other industries, they
suggest that the state action doctrine would immunize such cooperation
from antitrust objections even if the McCarran-Ferguson Act were re-
pealed.25 In fact, however, without the exemption created by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, it is quite likely that insurers would be forced
to cease sharing data. The state action doctrine, a judicially created ex-
emption from federal antitrust law, emerged in Parker v. Brown,26 which
held that the Sherman Act27 was not intended to apply to combinations
created by actions of a state government."8 A two part test was developed
by the Court in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc."e to determine the applicability of the state action doc-
trine in a particular case. First, a state must clearly articulate its intent to
displace competition in a particular field with a regulatory structure.30
Second, under the so-called "active supervision" test, the state policy dis-
placing competition must be enforced actively by the state itself.31
It is doubtful whether information-sharing practices could qualify
23. See Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat.
476 (1968) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701(s), 1709, 1735(d), 1749bbb (1)-(21) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)). The Act states that one of its purposes is to "encourage and assist the various State
insurance authorities and the property insurance industry to develop and carry out statewide pro-
grams which will make necessary property insurance coverage against fire, crime, and other perils
more readily available for residential, business, and other properties meeting reasonable underwriting
standards." 82 Stat. 476, 556 (1968).
24. See North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casual Reciprocal Exch., 85 F. Supp. 961, 964 (D.
Ark. 1949) (absent contrary regulation, Sherman Act would control price fixing activities by insurance
association), aff'd, 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1950)
25. See Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon, supra note 1, at 378-80; see also R.A. Winter,
supra note 17.
26. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
28. Parker held that a marketing program imposed by the state of California that restricted out-
put of raisins did not violate the Sherman Act. "There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state
action in the [Shermani Act's legislative history." 317 U.S. at 351.
29. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
30. See also New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978) (following
Midcal).
31. Id. at 105.
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under the two pronged state action test. It is difficult to find a state intent
to displace competition. The primary purpose of most state insurance
codes is not to displace competition but to enhance it by preventing abuses
and protecting the public. 2 For example, the purpose of the New York
Code is "to promote the public welfare by regulating insurance rates,...
to promote price competition among insurers, to provide rates that are
responsive to competitive market conditions, to improve the availability
and reliability of insurance and to authorize and regulate cooperative ac-
tion among insurers." ' Since its provisions explicitly authorize industry
cooperation in a competitive context, such cooperation might not qualify
under the state action doctrine. 4
The second component of the state action doctrine, the active supervi-
sion test, raises even greater legal doubt. In the insurance marketplace,
many states employ forms of regulation that, although they regulate rates
extensively, do not completely suppress insurers' flexibility to set rates and
do not require that the state approve every filing. This type of regulation
may not be sufficient to invoke the state action exemption.' Insurers re-
main concerned that they would be subject to protracted litigation in al-
most every state which maintains some type of competitive rating
system.36
A recent FTC administrative decision involving six title insurance com-
panies illustrates this point.3 The FTC judge agreed that title insurance
was not covered by the McCarran-Ferguson Act and engaged in a state-
by-state examination of regulatory activities. Within weeks after the deci-
32. See supra note 13.
33. N.Y. INS. LAW § 2301 (McKinney 1985).
34. When the the primary insurer of nurse midwives went bankrupt, the American College of
Nurse-Midwives lost its blanket malpractice insurance coverage in mid-1985. When no single insur-
ance company was willing to provide coverage, nurse midwives faced the possibility of having to
terminate their operations. In the summer of 1986, however, several large insurance companies de-
cided to form a consortium in order to provide insurance coverage to nurse midwives. This decision
illustrates a form of voluntary joint agreements. American College of Nurse-Midwives, Nurse-
Midwives Obtain Liability Insurance From Insurance Consortium, Press Release & Fact Sheet (July
22, 1986).
35. Insurers conducting business in states with open competition systems are allowed to file rates
which are different from those recommended by the statistical reporting agency. Companies may file
their rates and use them unless specifically disallowed by the state insurance commissioner. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-9-9 (1987).
36. Many states use an open competition system, in which a company may select any rate it
wishes. Some states require that rates be approved by the state insurance department prior to use.
Other states allow companies to use any rates that have been filed with the state insurance department
although the insurance company may later require that the rates be amended. In 1986, New York
State adopted a hybrid approach with its flex rating system. The insurance department establishes
ranges within which rates may vary from the rates which the company has filed. See CuoMo
COMM'N, supra note 5, 93-98 (1986).
37. See In the Matter of Ticor Title Insurance Co., Federal Trade Commission Docket No. 9190,
initial decision at 159 (Dec. 22, 1986) (WESTLAW, FABR-FTC file).
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sion, class action suits were filed across the country alleging inadequate
state regulation of this activity.
8
The pall of legal uncertainty would cause many insurers to withdraw
from participation in insurance pools that encourage competition.B It
would also call into legal question voluntary activities such as Marketing
Assistance Plans (MAPs) which are designed to help small businesses and
others find insurance in the private marketplace when they experience
difficulty finding it on their own. Many state regulators have urged the
industry to adopt such plans as an alternative to state run plans because
they are superior and far less intrusive on private competition than joint
underwriting associations. Were the McCarran-Ferguson Act to be re-
pealed, these plans could face a legal challenge as an allegedly illegal
agreement to allocate customers. Insurance companies, which make little
if any profit from these activities, would certainly not want to participate
knowing that they would risk spending the next'several years involved in
expensive antitrust litigation. State insurance commissioners would find
themselves frustrated in carrying out their statutory obligation to ensure
that their citizens have adequate access to insurance coverage.4
These and other joint activities would be subject to a "rule of reason"
analysis that would be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
These cases tend to be highly specialized, involving the use of expert wit-
nesses, and are consequently very expensive to litigate. Insurers, even
those convinced that they will prevail in antitrust proceedings, would
probably avoid such potential litigation because of the high legal costs.4'
38. By the end of January 1985, 12 class action suits were filed throughout the United States
alleging that title insurance companies were violating antitrust laws. These cases were consolidated in
In re Real Estate Title & Settlement, Services Antitrust Litigation Multi-District Litigation Docket
No. 633 (filed Mar. 27, 1985, E.D.Pa.). The District Court approved the settlement on June 10,
1986. The Court of Appeals affirmed on March 3, 1987, 815 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1987).
39. Many insurers pool their resources to provide coverage where no one company would under-
write the risk. The profits derived from such a limited participation are likely to be small. If insurers
were to face the prospect of protracted and expensive antitrust litigation, they might decide not to
commit their resources to underwriting a risk which promises only marginal profits.
40. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11890 (West 1988) (obliging state insurance commissioner to
ensure adequate access to insurance coverage).
41. In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440-41 (1978), Chief Justice
Burger wrote:
With certain exceptions for conduct regarded as per se illegal because of unquestionably an-
ticompetitive effects ... the behavior proscribed by the [Sherman] Act is often difficult to
distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable business con-
duct. Indeed, the type of conduct charged to the incident in this case-the exchange of price
information among competitors-is illustrative in this regard. The imposition of criminal lia-
bility on a corporate official, or for that matter on a corporation directly, for engaging in such
conduct which only after the fact is determined to violate the statute because of anticompetitive
effects, without inquiring into the intent with which it was undertaken, holds out the distinct
possibility of overdeterrence; salutary and pro-competitive conduct lying close to the borderline
of impermissible conduct might be shunned by businessmen who chose to be excessively cau-
tious in the face of uncertainty regarding possible exposure to criminal punishment for even a
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In these conditions, many insurers might decline to participate with others
in jointly underwriting catastrophic risks, hazardous activities, and liabil-
ity coverage. Repealing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, therefore, would
tend to restrict rather than increase the availability of coverage for those
classes of policyholders that have the most difficulty obtaining it.
Conclusion
Competition has flourished in the insurance industry since the
McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed forty-five years ago. While it must
be acknowledged that in selective lines of business coverage may be diffi-
cult to obtain, this problem has arisen not because of a lack of competi-
tion, but because sweeping changes in our tort system have made the ac-
tivity nearly uninsurable.42
Proponents of the repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act have failed to
realize that the state action doctrine would not allow the continuation of
the joint activities which actually promote competition within the insur-
ance industry. The McCarran-Ferguson Act allows regulators to choose
whatever form of regulation they find most satisfactory. Its elimination
would send a message to state regulators that if they wished to retain full
jurisdiction over the insurance industry, they must revise their laws in
such a way as to adopt the most restrictive, anticompetitive form of regu-
lation possible. Years of legal uncertainty would certainly ensue, the pub-
lic interest would undoubtedly be injured, and small insurance companies,
lacking access to necessary data, would be forced to withdraw from the
marketplace.
Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith, and Simon have written a thoughtful,
valuable contribution to this symposium. While their analysis of the state
action doctrine is somewhat abbreviated, they have added considerably to
our understanding of the real reasons for the liability crisis.
good-faith error of judgment.
42. See TORT POLICY REPORT, supra note 4 at 30-52.

